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Abstract
This work studies the eﬀect of the value of the status quo in the candidates’
decisions and policy outcomes in a representative democracy with endogenous
candidates. Following the citizen-candidate model due to Besley and Coate
(1997) we show, for a unidimensional policy issue and for both an odd and
even number of citizens, that some equilibria only hold for certain values of
the status quo policy. In particular we find that a moderate status quo rules
out equilibrium outcomes in which there is an uncontested candidate and that
two-candidate equilibria exist more generally when the number of citizens is
even.
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1 Introduction
In a representative democracy, voters (or “citizens”) elect some representatives (or “politi-
cians”) who in turn, choose policies. It is generally assumed in this context that one or
several citizens (or parties) will always propose themselves as candidates for the repre-
sentation job. Nevertheless, every political system based on representative democracy
should provide a rule to determine the political action to be taken in the case when no
member of the society is willing to work as representative. This paper focuses on the
influence that the existing rule for such a case has over the electoral decisions of citizens
and candidates, and over the policies that are ultimately implemented in a representative
democracy.
The first model of representative democracy is due to Downs (1957). He studies the
policy outcomes when there are only two candidates, which appear exogenously.
Feddersen, Sened and Wright (1990) consider endogenous candidates, so that each
citizen decides whether or not to present his candidacy in order to be elected as repre-
sentative. They suppose that candidates can commit to fulfill their campaign promises
and they show that, if the policy issue is unidimensional, all running candidates propose
the median voter´s ideal policy.
More recently, there are two papers studying in depth what happens if these en-
dogenous candidates cannot commit themselves to implement any other policy but their
favorite one:
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) restrict attention to the case of sincere voting, a uni-
dimensional policy issue and agents with single-peaked preferences. They consider that
winning candidates obtain a direct benefit just for holding oﬃce. They compare outcomes
under plurality rule and a run-oﬀ system.
Besley and Coate (1997) present a model of representative democracy with endoge-
nous candidates and strategic voting. Their model is based on an abstract policy space,
but they study in more detail the specific case in which the policy has a single dimension,
the number of citizens is odd and the status quo policy takes an extreme value of zero.
Following their approach, we will analyze the unidimensional case in which agents have
Euclidean preferences, but we let the status quo take any value and we consider societies
with either an odd or even number of citizens.
The status quo is a default policy, implemented when no agent is willing to run
for oﬃce. We think that the default policy does not necessarily take a value of zero.
For instance, if there is no candidate, and no proposed policy, the actual implemented
policy could be the policy implemented in the past. Or it could be an exogenously given
“minimum standard”. In any case, it might be realistic in many scenarios to consider that
the status quo policy takes a positive value. We wish to study whether the equilibrium
outcomes obtained in Besley and Coate (1997) are robust to diﬀerent values of the status
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quo policy or not and whether they are aﬀected by the number of citizens being odd or
even.
We will show that some equilibria are dependant on the value of the status quo and, in
particular, we will see how uncontested elections are ruled out by a moderate value of the
default policy. Besley and Coate (1997) consider that single candidate equilibria are rare
in practice since they parallel the existence of a Condorcet winner. Building on the same
model to study the influence of lobbies, Felli and Merlo (2001) disregard uncontested
elections and restrict their attention to two-candidate equilibria, justifying their choice
on grounds of realism. We oﬀer an alternative explanation to support two-candidate
equilibria: For a moderate status quo, we find that not even a Condorcet winner may
stand as lone candidate so long as the benefit of holding oﬃce is not high.
Moreover, we find that when the number of citizens is even, two-candidate equilibria
exist more generally than when the number of citizens is odd whereas conditions for
existence of a single candidate equilibrium become more restrictive. We also find that the
value of the status quo policy is similarly relevant to the existence and characterization of
single candidate equilibria when the number of citizens is even. Regardless of the number
of citizens, a moderate status quo will guarantee competition in the electoral process.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates our case with an
example, Section 3 presents the model, Section 4 analyses the influence of the status quo
location in the existence and characterization of equilibria with an odd number of voters,
Section 5 extends the previous results to a society with an even number of citizens and
Section 6 concludes and proposes other extensions to Besley and Coate (1997).
2 An Example
Imagine a group of students, a class, which are to elect a representative. Students will
vote for any of those who wish to be a candidate and the one with the most votes will be
their representative. If there is no candidate, there will be no representative and therefore
no defense of the rights of students. Candidates are required to present a written inform
of their intentions and objectives to the Dean, and they have to make a speech to the
class; therefore, to be candidate is costly. The representative´s task will be to defend the
rights of the students. He can be very mild in this defense and submissive with faculty, or
on the contrary he can be aggressive and organize protests about everything. The only
significant diﬀerence in electing one candidate over another will be the attitude that he
will show towards faculty, specifically the intensity of his animosity, which depends on
his character.
Students attitudes range from a positive disposition with, and no intention whatsoever
to defend any rights against authority, to open hostility towards faculty. Most of them are
moderate, do not want trouble or protests, but would like their representative to politely
but firmly fight for some minimums such as knowing the dates of exams in advance, or
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teachers being available in their oﬃce hours. If there is no representative, none of these
minimums will be guaranteed.
In this setting, although nobody likes being a candidate, someone will volunteer in
order to have a representative and prevent the undesired outcome of no representation.
In fact, we have got two possible outcomes in equilibrium:
The first possibility is a single candidate who becomes the representative with no
election. It has to be a moderate. If it was an extremist, moderates will be as unhappy
as not having representative. Moderate students dislike protests and strikes as much as
not having any defense of their rights. They prevent this outcome presenting a moderate
as candidate.
The second possibility is two candidates, one hostile towards faculty, the other one
submissive. Both of them have the same support and the class splits into two excited
camps. No moderate would stand a chance in this scenario. Voting, and most likely
disorder, will follow. Somehow, due to uncertain reasons (miscounting of votes being one
of the main ones), one of the two will win.
This class corresponds to the specific case studied in detail by Besley and Coate in
which the status quo takes an undesired extreme value. Now let us introduce a subtle
change in the setting:
We still have the same students, the same class (we will call it class A) and the same
decision to be made.
Now, there is another class, class B, which has previously elected a representative.
We do not care about how or who has been elected, or about preferences in this class.
What matters is that class B already has a representative when class A is to elect its
own.
The Dean rules that it is undesirable for a class to have no representative, so if class
A presents no candidate, the representative of class B will also be representing class A.
It seems reasonable.
It means that class A’s political conditions have changed. Now there is an exogenous
status quo: The representative in class B. If he is an extremist for class A standards, the
change is unimportant, because the status quo is as undesired as it was in the previous
situation, and a moderate will be willing to be the lone candidate and representative.
However... What happens if the representative of class B is considered a moderate
in class A? In other words, what happens if the status quo for class A takes a moderate
value?
Then moderates in class A will be happy enough to delegate everything to the ex-
ogenous representative. They will not be willing to assume any cost of candidacy, since
representative B would conveniently do the job for them. Extremists in class A will think
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diﬀerently. They do not like the representative of class B. As long as there is no moderate
candidate in class A, submissive extremists would like to present a candidate and win
unopposed. So would aggressive extremists. But they cannot. They both know that as
soon as an extremist candidate appears, a moderate one would come to defeat it.
Equilibrium with one student as the lone candidate will not occur. An extremist can
not run unopposed. Moderate students can, but are unwilling to do so.
The class is bound to the din and disorder which precedes and follows the voting
when there are two alternatives with equal support: A submissive extremist candidate,
and an aggressive extremist candidate. If one of each type presents his candidacy, the
students no longer bother about the exogenous status quo. They simply support the side
they prefer.
If the status quo takes a moderate value, we will see in the following sections how
some equilibria are ruled out, as has happened in our class.
Other examples could be an employees committee electing a speaker to talk to the
employer, or a social club electing a president.
3 The Model
We follow Besley and Coate (1997), and consider the specific case in which the policy
space is unidimensional. It is an endogenous candidates model of representative democ-
racy with the following characteristics:
Let N be a finite set of citizens. Initially we will suppose that the number of citizens
is odd, in order to easily identify the median.
The set of policy alternatives is the unit interval [0,1]. The implemented policy will
be denoted by p.
Each citizen i ∈ N has Euclidean preferences with an ideal policy πi ∈ [0, 1] and cares
only about the policy outcome p, not the identity of the representative (we will briefly
introduce a benefit of holding oﬃce at the end of sections 4 and 5). Preferences over
lotteries (denoted by L) will be measured by means of a Von Neumann - Morgenstern
utility function.
Any citizen can be a candidate, but doing so is costly. Let ci denote the cost that
citizen i assumes: ci = 0 if citizen i does not run for oﬃce and ci = c > 0 if citizen i is a
candidate. Therefore, the utility function of citizen i, where p is the policy outcome, is
as follows:
Ui(p, ci) = − |p− πi|− ci.
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Let πm denote the median voter’s ideal policy and let q denote the status quo policy,
implemented when the set of candidates is empty (no citizen decides to run for oﬃce).
Candidates cannot commit themselves to implement any other policy but their fa-
vorite one if they come to power.
The political process has three stages. In the first stage, citizens decide whether to
enter or not the race for oﬃce; in a second stage each citizen casts his vote for one of
the self-declared candidates; and in the third stage, the winner candidate implements his
favorite policy. Agents vote strategically, thus not necessarily supporting their favorite
candidate in the contest, and the voting rule is plurality: The candidate with the most
votes wins. If several candidates tie for the most votes, one of them will be selected at
random.
At the first stage, citizens face only two alternatives: To enter the race for oﬃce, or
not to enter. A vector of entry decisions contains the decision by every citizen i ∈ N .
Equilibrium is defined as a vector of entry decisions and a voting behavior such that:
a) The vector of entry decisions is a Nash equilibrium at the entry decision stage,
given the existing voting behavior.
b) The voting behavior results in an undominated Nash equilibrium at the voting
stage for any non-empty set of candidates.
In an equilibrium no citizen can obtain any benefit from individual changes in either
his entry decision or his vote.
Under the assumption that the status quo policy is q = 0, and considering only pure
strategies, the following result is obtained:
Proposition 1 (Besley and Coate, 1997) A single candidate equilibrium in which i is
the unopposed candidate exists if and only if:
1.i) πi ≥ c, and
1.ii) there is no citizen k such that 2πm − πi < πk < πi − c or πi + c < πk < 2πm − πi.
Condition 1.i) guarantees that citizen i wants to run against the default outcome.
Condition 1.ii) guarantees that the unopposed candidate is close enough to the median
ideal policy so that whoever could beat him has no incentive to present himself.
Proposition 2 (Besley and Coate, 1997) A two-candidate equilibrium in which i and j
run against each other exists if and only if:
2.i) (πi+πj)
2
= πm, and
2.ii) |πi − πj| ≥ 2c.
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Condition 2.i) says that the two candidates’ favorite policies are at the same distance
away from the median voter’s ideal policy (and on opposite sides). As a result, both
candidates will obtain half of the votes (an implicit assumption being that the median is
unique, thus the same number of citizens lie to its left and to its right).
Condition 2.ii) guarantees that in such circumstances (one half chance of winning),
both candidates have an incentive to present themselves, since the distance between the
two proposed policies is suﬃciently big.
Under very mild conditions, no equilibrium with three candidates hold. Those con-
ditions are:
1. A “non-clumping” assumption: Given any interval which contains the ideal points
of at least a third of the citizens, any other bigger interval is not empty.
2. Abstinence of Indiﬀerent Voters: Citizens will abstain if they are indiﬀerent be-
tween all candidates.
Equilibria with four or more candidates occur only under very extraordinary condi-
tions. Besley and Coate do not study them in detail, only indicating that no more than
two of the candidates can be winning; the rest being mere spoilers, and that voters for
the spoilers must be indiﬀerent between all winning candidates.
4 Status Quo and Equilibria with an Odd Number
of Citizens
In this section we analyze how the value of the status quo policy aﬀects the results
obtained by Besley and Coate (1997) to see whether their equilibria hold if q 6= 0 or, on
the contrary, if significant diﬀerences arise in policy outcome, depending on the status
quo.
We will suppose that the cost of entry c is not too large. If the cost of entry was
suﬃciently large, no citizen would be a candidate. We will only consider the cases in
which the cost of running for oﬃce is reasonably low:
Assumption: c ≤ min
©
2
3
πm,
2
3
(1− πm)
ª
. Note that πm is not necessarily equal to
(1− πm).
If the status quo can take diﬀerent values, Proposition 1 has to be restated:
Proposition 3 Given q ∈ [0, 1], a single candidate equilibrium in which i is the unop-
posed candidate exists if and only if:
(i) |πi − q| ≥ c, and
(ii) there is no citizen k such that 2πm − πi < πk < πi − c or πi + c < πk < 2πm − πi.
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Proposition 3 coincides with Proposition 1 in the particular case of q = 0.
But if q has a positive value, the first condition for the case of an unopposed candidate
has to be modified. It now says that in order to have an incentive for assuming the cost
of running for oﬃce, citizen i must have a favorite policy suﬃciently far from the status
quo. If this condition was not met, agent i would drop his candidacy, accept q as the
implemented policy, and avoid the cost c of running for oﬃce.
The second condition remains unchanged. It describes the citizens who are suitable
for running unopposed. If any of them were to be a candidate, no other citizen who can
beat the candidate has the incentive to do so. Each one of these citizens knows that he
could find no opposition if he decided to be a candidate.
Let Xcon denote the interval [x, x] ⊂ [0, 1] consisting of points πx such that for all
πy ∈ [0, 1], if there were a citizen x with an ideal preference πx and a citizen y with an
ideal preference πy, and x was running alone for oﬃce, then y would not be willing to
run against x because the chances of winning do not compensate the cost of entry in the
race (either y would lose, or would tie but find it not worthwhile to run for a tied race, or
would win but find it not worthwhile to run not even for a victory). For most πx ∈ Xcon
and πy ∈ [0, 1] there will not exist such citizens x and y with these particular preferences,
for the interval of preferences is continuous and the number of citizens finite, but still we
can argue that such theoretical citizen x, if he existed and ran for oﬃce, he would surely
find no opposition from any single other citizen in equilibrium. We will call Xcon “strict
consensus interval”, for if a candidacy belonging to it was presented, then it could raise
"consensus" in the sense that it could face no competition in equilibrium.
The extension of the "strict consensus interval" will be a function of the location of
the median’s ideal point πm and the entry cost c. From condition (ii) in Proposition 3,
it follows that for the purpose of this section, Xcon = [πm − 12c, πm +
1
2
c]. For any given
πl candidacy, only those citizens with an ideal preference closer to that of the median
would defeat l. But if πl ∈ Xcon, then those who could beat l are not willing to pay the
cost of running in order to do so, since πl is suﬃciently close to their ideal outcome (the
distance separating them is less than the cost of running c).
However, it is possible that some other candidacies outside of the “strict consensus
interval” would still face no opposition, for the "citizen y" with the ideal policy point πy
that would lead y to have an incentive and a chance to beat such candidacies may not
exist. Let us visualize this with the aid of Figure 1.
A citizen with an ideal preference located in πm − 12c would face no opposition, for
only other citizens with preferences below πm + 12c would defeat him, and these citizens
would rather accept πm− 12c as the policy outcome than to bear the costs of running and
implementing their favorite policy. This is no longer true for citizen l. He is at a distance
d to the left of πm − 12c. Any citizen h whose ideal outcome lies in the circle of radius
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1 πm 
Xcon 
0 
πm+c/2 πm-c/2 
πl
Figure 1: Potential consensus candidates
d around πm + 12c can beat l because πh is closer than πl to πm, and the candidate who
is closer to the median always wins a two-way race. Any citizen h in this circle also has
the will to run and defeat l, for the distance between πl and πh is higher than the cost
of running for oﬃce. Now, what if there is no such citizen h whose preference lies in the
circle of radius d? Then l can run unopposed. The bigger the empty circle around one
of the extremes of Xcon, the further away from the median in the other direction that a
candidate can run alone in equilibrium.
In particular, if the distance from the high extreme of Xcon to the nearest citizen’s
ideal point is db, then a citizen k with preferences to the left of the lower limit of Xcon by
a distance less than db can also run unopposed. Similarly if there is no citizen within a
distance da of the lower extreme ofXcon, then a citizen within da of the higher limit ofXcon
may also run alone in equilibrium. Let X∗con denote this “extended consensus interval”
which now includes every citizen who can run unopposed if he chooses to present his
candidacy (we will call these citizens “potential consensus candidates”).
Formally, let db = min
i∈N
|b− πi|, da = min
i∈N
|a− πi| and X∗con = (x−db, x+da), where a
and b are a function of the location of the median πm and the entry cost c. Throughout
this section, a = πm − 12c and b = πm +
1
2
c, thus they coincide with the limits of Xcon,
but this will not always be the case when the number of citizens is even.
FromProposition 3, condition (ii)we can then obtainX∗con =
£
πm − 12c− db, πm +
1
2
c+ da
¤
.
We are now ready to rewrite condition (ii) in Proposition 3 as:
(ii) πi ∈ X∗con
This form of expression will prove useful later on. The idea behind condition (ii) in
Proposition 3 is that whoever may beat the single candidate has no incentive to do so.
If citizen i is to be a single candidate in equilibrium, she must be a "potential consensus
candidate", that is, her ideal point must lie within the "extended consensus interval"
X∗con.
We have seen that conditions for the existence of a single candidate equilibrium have
changed, due to the appearance of q in condition (ii) in Proposition 3. Only “potential
consensus candidates”, those with a favorite policy contained in X∗con, have a chance of
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1 q πm 
Xcon 
q+c 0 
c 
No incentive 
Figure 2: Single candidate equilibria with an extreme status quo
being the single candidate in an equilibrium. But this is a necessary condition, not a
suﬃcient condition.
The value of the status quo policy aﬀects which of these potential consensus candidates
can be the single candidate in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 Let q ∈
£
0, πm − 32c− db
¤
, then there is a single candidate equilibrium in
which citizen i is the unopposed candidate if and only if πi ∈ X∗con.
Proof. If i is a potential consensus candidate, then by definition, it meets the re-
quirements in condition (ii) of Proposition 3. And given that q ∈
£
0, πm − 32c− db
¤
, for
any πi ∈ X∗con, condition (i) is also verified, since πi ∈ X∗con implies πi ≥ πm − 12c − db,
and then πi − q ≥
¡
πm − 12c− db
¢
−
¡
πm − 32c− db
¢
≥ c. If πi /∈ X∗con, then i cannot be
a single candidate in equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Let q ∈
£
πm +
3
2
c+ da, 1
¤
, then a single candidate equilibrium exists in
which citizen i is the unopposed candidate if and only if πi ∈ X∗con.
This result is obtained by symmetry.
The idea in this Proposition (and Corollary) is that, when the status quo is too low
(too high), each potential consensus candidate has an incentive to present himself and
stand as a single candidate.
We can see how this happens in Figure 2. Citizens near the status quo have no in-
centive to present themselves as the single candidate. They are within a “no incentive
area” which extends to a distance c (the cost of entry) from the status quo. The po-
tential consensus candidates are far enough from this zone (throughout Figures 2 to 4
we will assume that there are no “gaps” or empty neighborhoods around Xcon, thus the
“consensus interval” is Xcon = X∗con). Their favorite policies are shown in a thicker black
line, which extends around the median policy.
However, if q takes bigger values, the “no incentive area” will be shifting to the right
(Figure 3). The citizens whose favorite policy is in the lower part of X∗con (thick dotted
line in Figure 3) will no longer have an incentive to present themselves as lone candidates.
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1 q πm 
Xcon 
q+c q-c 
0 
c 
No incentive 
Figure 3: Single candidate equilibria with a not so extreme status quo
They would rather accept the new status quo policy, which is not too far from their ideal.
Among the potential consensus candidates only those whose ideal policy is suﬃciently
high to be far apart from an increasing status quo can be single candidates in equilibrium.
These possible equilibrium outcomes are marked, once again, with a thicker black line in
Figure 3.
Proposition 5 Let q ∈
£
πm − 32c− db, πm −
1
2
c+ da
¤
, then a single candidate equilib-
rium exists in which i is the unopposed candidate if and only if πi ∈
£
q + c, πm +
1
2
c+ da
¤
.
Proof. Let πi ∈
£
q + c, πm +
1
2
c+ da
¤
this means that πi ≥ q + c or equivalently
πi − q ≥ c, so that condition (i) in Proposition 3 is met.
Since πm− 32c−db ≤ q ≤ πm−
1
2
c+da then πm− 12c−db ≤ q+c ≤ πm+
1
2
c+da which
implies that
£
q + c, πm +
1
2
c+ da
¤
∈
£
πm − 12c− db, πm +
1
2
c+ da
¤
, therefore πi ∈ X∗con,
and condition (ii) in Proposition 3 is also met.
We have yet to prove that there are no other possible single candidate equilibria. This
is almost immediate:
Let πj /∈ X∗con then πj cannot be single candidate equilibrium, because it does not
meet condition (ii) in Proposition 3.
Let πj ∈ X∗con but πj /∈
£
q + c, πm +
1
2
c+ da
¤
, then πj < q+c or equivalently πj−q <
c, so we can see that condition (i) is not met.
There is a strong implication in this Proposition. Let q = πm − 12c + da, then there
is only one possible single candidate equilibrium. The single candidate’s favorite policy
is πi = πm + 12c+ da. This is just a very specific case, but if the status quo takes exactly
this value, we have reduced the multiple possible single candidate equilibria in Besley
and Coate´s model to just one.
Once again, we obtain the following Corollary by symmetry:
Corollary 2 Let q ∈
£
πm +
1
2
c− db, πm + 32c+ da
¤
, then a single candidate equilibrium
exists in which i is the unopposed candidate if and only if πi ∈
£
πm − 12c− db, q − c
¤
.
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Figure 4: No single candidate equilibrium with a moderate status quo
The next result is one of our main contributions. It shows that existence of single
candidate equilibria in Besley and Coate´s model is dependant on the value of the status
quo policy. If such a policy takes a moderate value, around the median of the favorite
policies of the citizens in the society, then there will be no political equilibrium in which
only one candidate runs for oﬃce. To reiterate, a moderate status quo rules out political
equilibrium in which there are no competed elections.
Comparing Figure 2 and Figure 3, we can imagine what will happen if the status quo
keeps shifting to the right: The dotted thick line (those potential consensus candidates
who wish to not run for oﬃce unopposed) gets bigger and bigger, and the thick black
continuous line gets shorter and shorter until it disappears. Therefore, there is no single
candidate equilibrium. (Figure 4)
The intuition is simple. Those who could stand alone as unopposed candidates wish
not to do so, and those who have an incentive to present themselves to defeat the default
policy are too far apart from the median and as a consequence, if any of them presents
his candidacy, then another citizen closer to the median will also run to defeat him.
For example, let us imagine that the median citizen´s ideal policy is the default policy.
In this case, neither the median citizen nor any of the potential consensus candidates
would like to assume the cost of presenting himself as a candidate. Only extremists
would be willing to do so. But if any one of them presents his candidacy, either the
median voter or another one of the potential consensus candidates will now present
himself to prevent this extremist from choosing policy. This is not an equilibrium, since
the extremist now obtains only costs presenting himself and losing, so he would drop
from the race. If the extremist drops his candidacy, then so will the moderate, for once
the menace of an extreme outcome has disappeared, there is no point in assuming the
cost of running for oﬃce.
Theorem 1 If q ∈
¡
πm − 12c+ da, πm +
1
2
c− db
¢
, then there is no equilibrium with a
single candidate.
Proof. Condition to run unopposed: πi ∈ X∗con.
Condition to be willing to run: πi ∈ [0, q − c] ∪ [q + c, 1] . But:
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q ∈
¡
πm − 12c+ da, πm +
1
2
c− db
¢
implies that X∗con
T
[[0, q − c] ∪ [q + c, 1]] = ∅
We have now completed our study of the implications of the diﬀerent possible values
of the status quo policy with regards to the existence of uncontested elections when the
number of citizens is odd. We have seen that there are two relevant intervals:
First, there is an interval around the median of the favorite policies, which contains
the potentially unopposed candidates, the source of single candidate equilibria. This
interval is fixed. And there is a second relevant interval, around the status quo: Citizens
whose favorite policies are in this interval will not be interested in running for oﬃce
unopposed.
The interval around the status quo can be imagined as a dark cloud: If it is far from
the median, it does not aﬀect the equilibria; as it gets closer to the median, it “hides”
part of the first relevant interval, or the totality of it. As in an eclipse, partial or total
eclipse, hopes of a single candidate equilibrium fade and disappear from view when the
two intervals, one around the median, another around the status quo, are one on top of
each other. We can visualize this eﬀect by comparing Figure 2 (two separated intervals),
Figure 3 (“partial eclipse”) and Figure 4 (“total eclipse”). If the “dark cloud” was blown
by the wind to even higher values, single candidate equilibria will resuscitate once more,
first the lower values near the median, the whole interval X∗con afterwards.
At this point we find it worthwhile to briefly digress in order to note that our results
to note are not robust to the consideration of a benefit from holding oﬃce γ > 0. If the
benefit from holding oﬃce is positive but less than the cost of entry, results are qualita-
tively the same, but the interval of "potential consensus candidates" shrinks exactly as
if the cost of entry was lowered by the amount of benefit from holding oﬃce. For one
candidate equilibria, we can consider c0 = c − γ to be the eﬀective cost of entry, and
our results hold true by simply replacing c by c0. However, if γ > c, then condition i) in
Proposition 3 is trivially satisfied and never binds, X∗con = πm, our results do not apply,
and the median is the single candidate in equilibrium, regardless of the status quo value.
In the absence of high benefits from holding oﬃce capable of oﬀsetting the cost of
entry, the inexistence of single candidate equilibria when the status quo takes a moderate
value provides a stronger motivation to pay attention to multi-candidate equilibria. We
now proceed to study if the status quo plays any role in determining such equilibria.
Proposition 2 in Section 3 characterized equilibria with two candidates. We now argue
that it holds as stated for any value of status quo policy:
Condition 2.i) says that both candidates would tie in an election, since their ideal
policy points are located at exactly the same distance from the median. This electoral
result will occur regardless of the value of the status quo.
Condition 2.ii) states that, given a one half chance of winning, both citizens prefer to
maintain their candidacy regardless of the value of the status quo policy. The intuition
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is that, in a two candidates equilibrium, if one of the two decided to drop his candidacy,
he would consider that his opponent will still run for oﬃce, and will, of course, win.
This possibility is so undesirable for the citizen who is hesitating to run, that he will
present his candidacy and pay the entry cost in order to have at least a fifty per cent
chance of avoiding such an unattractive outcome. The status quo would only come into
play if both of them drop their candidacy simultaneously, which may not occur since the
citizens do not coordinate their actions. Therefore, both citizens prefer to maintain their
candidacies and this kind of equilibrium is not aﬀected by the value of the status quo
policy.1
The same argument applies to any situation which involves the entry decisions of a
bigger number of citizens: If n citizens were running in equilibrium, each one of them
stays in the race because he expects the electoral outcome to significantly worsen if he
dropped his candidacy and the race was only between the remaining n − 1 citizens.
Three-candidate equilibria did not exist when the status quo was extreme, and will not
exist if the status quo is moderate or anything in between, for the status quo does not
enter into the calculations of the outcome of an hypothetical election between the other
two opponents, calculations that each one of the candidates has to do in order to decide
whether to run or not. If one of the three dropped out of the race, sincere voting will result
to elect a winner between the remaining two, and no attention will be paid to the status
quo. Besley and Coate present conditions under which at least one of the candidates
always has an incentive to step out of the race. Under these conditions, the location of
the status quo is irrelevant to the inexistence of equilibria with three candidates.
Multi-candidate equilibria with more than three candidates are more involved. Besley
and Coate argue that there cannot be three tying winning candidates, but equilibria with
one or two winners and several "spoilers" (candidates who are losing) are possible. In
order for n candidates to run for oﬃce in equilibrium, the following conditions must hold:
1. Voters for any of the spoilers must be indiﬀerent between all winning candidates.
2. Common beliefs about the voting behavior that would result if any of the can-
didates dropped his candidacy are such that each one of the candidates, winners and
spoilers alike, expect the political outcome to significantly shift away from his prefer-
ences if he is the only one to quit the race.
Condition 2 sets a very demanding requirement in beliefs, which makes the existence
of these kind of equilibria less plausible. Informally, such beliefs imply that spoilers
are not spoiling the chances of the candidates with preferences close to theirs, but on
the contrary they are preventing some far-oﬀ unwanted candidate from winning. The
assumption of Euclidean preferences lead naturally to the opposite beliefs (i.e. a far left
candidate’s decision to run is generally believed to handicap the chances of victory for a
moderate leftist candidate, not that of a rightist candidate).
1The consideration of the benefits from holding oﬃce would require to replace c by c00 = c − 12γ,
making condition 2.ii) trivially satisfied for γ ≥ 2c.
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Nevertheless, these kind of equilibria might exist. If they do, the location of the status
quo need not aﬀect them, but it may well do so if the value of the status quo somehow
influences the common beliefs about the voting behavior oﬀ the equilibrium path (beliefs
about what would happen if one of the candidates quit the race). The status quo might
aﬀect beliefs by providing a cue (a reference point) to each citizen about which candidate
the majority of voters with similar preferences would select as the "probable winner"
that it is strategically convenient to support to victory if the equilibrium was broken by
the withdrawal of a candidacy.
We conclude this section by summarizing its main results: As the status quo is less
extreme, there are less citizens who may run as the single candidate, and if the status
quo is suﬃciently close to the median voter’s favorite policy, uncontested elections will
not occur (unless the benefits from holding oﬃce oﬀset the cost of running for oﬃce).
The status quo has no influence over the existing two-candidate equilibria, nor over the
inexistence of three candidate equilibria, and the influence over equilibria with more than
three candidates depends on the specification of beliefs.
5 Equilibria with Even Number of Citizens
In this section we extend the analysis of equilibria to encompass both an even and odd
number of citizens. We do so for a general expression of the status quo value, so taking
q to be zero would allow the reader to compare the diﬀerences from Besley and Coate
(1997) that are due exclusively to N being even. As in their one-dimensional model, in
this section we assume that citizens care only about the implemented policy. We will
argue that the influence of the status quo on policy outcomes is qualitatively the same
for either an even or an odd number of citizens.
We require a bit more notation to deal with the new definition of a median with an
even number of citizens:
Let us order the citizens according to their ideal policy from first (furthest low or
left) to last (furthest high or right). Then let πlm (for "lower median") denote the ideal
point of the citizen in the N
2
th position, and let πhm (for "higher median") denote the
ideal point of the citizen in the
¡
N
2
+ 1
¢
th position. Denote by g (for "gap") the distance
g = πhm − πlm. If this "gap" g is zero, we can say πlm = πhm = πm.
Let us also extend our definition and intuition of da, db, Xcon and X∗con (which we
previously defined for the specific case in which there is an odd number of citizens) to
the general case in which we may have any number of citizens:
Xcon = [x, x] is the "strict consensus interval" and its definition remains unchanged,
though its extension will now also depend on the gap g between medians, and not only in
the entry cost c. Candidates with an ideal point within it would be able to run unopposed
no matter what other citizens’ ideal policies may be.
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da and db are (respectively) the minimum distance from a and b to some citizen’s
ideal policy. And X∗con = [x− db, x+ da] is the interval such that any citizen whose ideal
policy lies in it is a potential consensus candidate, and would face no opposition if he
chose to run for oﬃce.
What does change is the location of a and b, which are functions of the location of
the two medians ideal policies πlm and πhm, and of the cost of entry c. a and b are such
that a citizen k with an ideal policy πk = a is the only citizen that would run against any
hypothetical candidacy πy ∈ (x, 1] and only a citizen p with a preferred policy πp = b
would run against any conceivable candidacy πy ∈ [0, x).
Summarizing what we have just said: lone candidates with favorite policies between
x and x will never face opposition in equilibrium; candidates with preferences just below
x would see how a candidate with an ideal point of b runs to defeat them, but if there
is no one around b, then candidates to the left of x can still run unopposed as long as
their distance to the left of b is no bigger than the radius of the empty interval around
b. Similarly, candidates to the right x can run unopposed as long as there is an empty
interval around a.
Now we are ready to generalize Proposition 3 in order to encompass both the N even
and the N odd cases:
Proposition 6 For any number of citizens, a single candidate equilibrium in which i
is the unopposed candidate exists if and only if:
(i) |πi − q| ≥ c, and
(ii) πi ∈ X∗con.
Proposition 6 holds regardless of the number of citizens essentially due to the way in
which we have chosen to define X∗con: The first condition guarantees that i would like to
run unopposed; and the second condition says that no one would like to oppose him if i
chose to run.
However, in order to have a complete characterization of the single candidate equi-
libria, we are required to specify the limits of X∗con, or in other words we need to specify
x, x, a and b, which determine (respectively), the lower and upper limits of the "strict
consensus interval", da, and db.
Case 1.1 If N is odd, or N is even and g = 0, then x = πm− 12c; x = πm+
1
2
c; a = πm−
1
2
c and b = πm + 12c.
Section 4 dealt with the odd case. For the other subcase, it is enough to note that
if N is even but the "gap" between medians is zero, then the situation is the same as if
the two identical medians were only one and the number of citizens was odd: Whoever
is closer to the two medians in a two way race will win, so the model works exactly the
same as in the N odd case.
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Figure 5: Extended consensus interval
Case 1.2 If N is even, and 0 < g ≤ 1
2
c, then x = πlm− 12c; x = πhm+
1
2
c; b = πlm+
1
2
c;
a = πhm − 12c.
If a citizen k whose favorite policy is πk = πlm − 12c presents his candidacy, only
citizens with ideal preferences above b = πlm + 12c would be willing to run against k,
and they do not do so because the "lower median" lm would not vote for them against
k, and therefore they would not win, but at most tie if they gathered support from the
"high median" hm. However, in order for a citizen h to be willing to run for a tied race,
then the distance from her ideal policy πh to πk ought to be twice the cost of running
and such big distance implies that the high median would actually prefer k to win, so h
would not even tie but lose if she run for oﬃce.
The inequality πh ≥ πk + 2c implies πh − πhm ≥ 2c− (12c+ g) ≥
1
2
c+ g = πhm − πk.
Therefore, πlm − 12c ∈ Xcon and citizen k is a "potential consensus candidate". Symmet-
rically, so would a citizen with an ideal preference of πhm + 12c, and of course so would
anyone in between. But now, imagine a citizen p with an ideal point anywhere below
that of k. Then a citizen with an ideal point of b would be willing to run against p and
would gather the vote of the low median, thus defeating p. Therefore, p cannot be a
single candidate in equilibrium... Unless there is no one around b to defeat p, as it is
the case in Figure 5, where no citizen has as ideal policy anywhere in between πhm and
πhm+1, so the interval of potential consensus extends all the way down to πp.
Case 1.3 If N is even, and 1
2
c < g ≤ 2c, then x = πhm − c; x = πlm + c; b = πhm + c;
a = πlm − c.
A good way to visualize why these are the correct values is to start with πlm, and
then move away to more extreme positions. The low median could be a single candidate,
for no one can beat him, and those who can tie (the high median and whoever is near the
high median) are not willing to pay the cost of running for a tied race. As we marginally
move to lower ideal values close to πlm, the same argument holds (adding that only the
low median could defeat them and is clearly unwilling to run to do so), until we reach
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πk = πhm− c. A citizen with an ideal point of b = πhm+ c will be willing to pay the cost
of running just for a tied race. In fact, for any citizen with ideal points below that of k,
the high median and all those to the right of the median will rather have b than πk, thus
the race will be at least tied, and the result is that no citizen with an ideal point below
πhm − c can run unopposed, once again unless there is no citizen with an ideal point of
b or around b.
Case 1.4 If N is even, and g > 2c, then X∗con = φ, there is no potential consensus
candidate, and there is no single candidate equilibrium.
If the distance separating the low and high medians is suﬃciently high, or alterna-
tively, if the cost of running for oﬃce is suﬃciently small and there is some distance
between the ideal points of the two medians, then the medians would rather run, even
against each other, and tie rather than letting an uncontested election happen.
With regards to condition (i) in Proposition 6, an analysis of the eﬀect of diﬀerent val-
ues of the status quo policy over single candidate equilibria would prove to be analogous
to the one we did for the N odd case:
If the status quo policy is extreme (either too low or too high), then any potential
consensus candidate may stand as an unopposed candidate in equilibrium.
As the status quo takes more moderate values, some of the potential consensus candi-
dates would find no incentive to run alone to replace it, so the set of possible uncontested
candidates in equilibrium shrinks as the status quo policy comes approaches the me-
dian(s).
If the status quo policy comes too close to the midpoint between the medians (how
close depends on the extension of the interval of the potential consensus candidates),
then no single candidate is guaranteed to run alone in equilibrium (in some knife-edge
results it may be the case that a particular citizen in one of the extremes of X∗con may
succeed to run unopposed due to some other citizen who is indiﬀerent between running
or not, choosing not to do so).
The idea is the same as what we have already iterated in the previous section: Of
all the potential consensus candidates, those who are too close to the status quo will not
run alone in equilibrium.
This is true regardless of the number of citizens being odd or even, or the distance
between the ideal points of any citizen.
Also, it follows that if all the potential consensus candidates’ ideal policies are nearby
the status quo, there will be no uncontested election.
Since consensus candidates are relatively moderate, the conclusion is that a moderate
status quo will eﬀectively rule out uncontested elections.
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Turning to two-candidate equilibria, we recall Proposition 2 in Section 3 and note
that it holds both for the odd case, and for the even case in which both medians share
the same ideal policy preference. However, if the medians’ ideal policies are not the same,
Proposition 2 no longer applies. Instead, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 7 If N is even and g > 0, a two-candidate equilibrium in which i and j
run against each other exists if and only if:
2.i) 1
2
(πi + πj) ∈ (πlm, πhm), and
2.ii) |πi − πj| ≥ 2c.
The intuition does replicate that of Proposition 2:
The first condition says that the race between the two candidates must be tied.
This occurs whenever the society splits into halves: The low median and everyone to
his left back one candidate; the right median and everyone to her right back the other
candidate. Society will split into halves whenever the midpoint between the ideal policies
of the candidates lies in between the ideal points of the medians.
The second condition should be familiar: It guarantees that both candidates are
willing to run against each other.
We notice that N being even instead of odd does not alter the fact that the status quo
plays no role in the determination of two-candidate equilibria. Similarly, regardless of
the number of citizens being odd or even, pure strategy equilibria with three candidates
will not exist (under the mild conditions enumerated in Section 3), and the status quo
will not aﬀect equilibria with more than three candidates so long as it does not aﬀect
the beliefs of the candidates about the voting behavior that would result if one of them
dropped out of the race (we refer to the previous section for the intuitions in support of
this argument).
However, an important diﬀerence has arisen between the results in this section and
the preceding one:
When the number of citizens is odd, two-candidate equilibria are generically non-
existent. That is, they do not exist for almost all of the possible distributions of ideal
policies that the citizens may have, or equivalently, they exist only for a set of measure
zero of distributions of citizen’s ideal policies.
Condition (i) in Proposition 2 stated: 1
2
(πi + πj) = πm. Given that the number of
citizens is finite, whereas the ideal preference of the median is located in a continuous
interval and thus it can take any of an infinite number of possible values, it follows
that only for a limited few out of an infinite number of possibilities will condition (i) be
satisfied.
Contrary to this negative result, if N is even and the two medians’ ideal points are
distinct, two-candidate equilibria are no longer generically non-existent, for condition (i)
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in Proposition 7 oﬀers a whole interval of possible values for the average of the ideal
policies of i and j. Let π = (π1, π2, ..., πN) be the vector composed of all the ideal points
of the N citizens. If N is even, and c < 1
2
, there exists an open set U ⊂ [0, 1]N such that
if π ∈ U, then there exists a two candidate equilibrium.
If N is odd, there does not exist such an open set, and two candidate equilibria are
generically non-existent.
From Propositions 6 and 7 together, we infer that the further apart the ideal policies
of the two medians are in relation to the cost of entry (in other words, the smaller
c in relation to g), the more diﬃcult it is for a single candidate to run unopposed in
equilibrium, and the less stringent the requirements are for two candidate competition
to be the electoral equilibrium.
In fact, if the number of citizens is even, for almost all possible distributions of
ideal points, there exists some positive value of the entry cost for which a two-candidate
equilibrium exists. We state the result in the following corollary.
Corollary 3 If the number of citizens is even, there exists a set U ⊂ [0, 1]N with Lebesgue
measure zero such that for any vector π = (π1, π2, ..., πN) of citizens’ policy preferences
not in U, there exists a positive value cπ such that if the cost of entry c is less than cπ,
then there exists a two-candidate equilibrium.
From the set of all the possible distributions of ideal policies {π1, π2, ..., πn} that
a group of N citizens (N even) forming a society may have, the proportion of such
distributions of ideal policies in which the two medians have the same ideal policy is
zero. If the two medians have a diﬀerent ideal policy, then for a cost of entry equivalent
to less than a half of the distance between their favorite policies, they would run against
each other in equilibrium. Thus for the complement of the set in which the medians
share the same ideal point, there is some cost of entry that guarantees the existence of a
two-candidate equilibrium.
A two-candidate equilibrium is also almost sure to exist in a society with an even
number of citizens if we introduce a suﬃciently large benefit from holding oﬃce. Specif-
ically, if the benefit from holding oﬃce γ is bigger than 2c− g, then no citizen can be a
single candidate in equilibrium, and there exists an equilibrium in which the two medians
run against each other, whenever they have diﬀerent ideal policies. This result contrasts
with the case in which the number of citizens is odd, when a big benefit from holding
oﬃce leads to the existence of a single candidate equilibrium for any value of the status
quo policy, but it is similar to Osborne and Slivinski’s (1996) results for equilibria under
plurality rule.
The findings in this section have shown that as the gap separating the ideal policies
advocated by the medians increases relative to the cost of entry, the set of citizens who
may win an uncontested election in equilibrium shrinks and eventually becomes empty,
whereas the possibility of a two-candidate competition outcome becomes more and more
likely until such an of equilibrium surely exists.
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6 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has achieved two goals: Besley and Coate’s (1997) model of representative
democracy in its unidimensional version has been extended to consider societies with
either an even or odd number of citizens, and to allow for any possible value of the status
quo policy.
The status quo value has proven to be relevant in the characterization of equilibrium
outcomes unless the reward for holding oﬃce is big compared to the cost of running
as candidate. In the case with an odd number of citizens and an extreme status quo
presented by Besley and Coate (1997), equilibria with two candidates are generically
non-existent and the natural prediction of the model is an uncontested election in which
an unopposed candidate wins. We have shown that a moderate value of the status quo
policy eliminates the incentive to run as single candidate and choose the policy outcome
that moderate citizens have when the status quo is extreme. As a consequence, if the
status quo is moderate and there are no other incentives to run, uncontested elections
will not occur in equilibrium.
We find that two-candidate equilibria exist more generally in a society with an even
number of citizens. The influence of the status quo policy is qualitatively the same
regardless of the number of citizens, but that of introducing a benefit from holding oﬃce
is not. These diﬀerences between polities with an even or an odd number of citizens
might suggest that the Besley and Coate (1997) model is better suited to explain the
behavior of voters and candidates in a small society or committee such as the one in our
example, rather than to explain bigger elections in which the exact number of citizens
should play no significant role.
Nevertheless, with the assumptions of an even number of citizens and a moderate
status quo, the model predicts no uncontested elections, and a race with two candidates
is the most natural equilibrium. We believe this represents a gain in realism to explain big
elections of a single representative, such as the US presidential elections. Therefore, we
argue in favor of discarding the assumptions of an odd number of citizens or an extreme
status quo when using the Besley and Coate (1997) model to analyze elections with a
large electorate.
Some other extensions to Besley and Coate (1997) that we think deserve further
research are the following:
1. To consider an endogenous status quo. Status quo could be a function of past
implemented policies in a dynamic model. This is in fact very likely to be the case in
many policy decisions. If there are no new proposals, probably the implemented policy
will look to the past.
2. To allow candidates to share the cost of running for oﬃce with voters who would
be willing to help in aﬀording such expenses. In this approach, a candidate would be the
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leader of a political party, and all the citizens who help in financing the campaign would
be party members.
3. To develop a version of the model with incomplete information about the distrib-
ution of the ideal policies of the citizens.
We let the study of these questions for further research.
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